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CAUSATION: PHILOSOPHY 
OF SCIENCE 
In The Critique of Pure Reason (first published in 1781), 
the German philosopher Immanuel Kant maintained that 
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causation was one of the fundamental concepts that ren-
dered the empirical world comprehensible to humans. By 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, psychology was 
beginning to show just how pervasive human reasoning 
concerning cause and effect is. Even young children seem 
to naturally organize their knowledge of the world 
according to relations of cause and effect. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that causation has been 
a topic of great interest in philosophy, and that many 
philosophers have attempted to analyze the relationship 
between cause and effect. Among the more prominent 
proposals are the following: Causation consists in the 
instantiation of exceptionless regularities (Hume 1975, 
1999; Mill1856; Hempel1965; Mackie 1974); causation is 
to be understood in terms of relations of probabilistic 
dependence (Reichenbach 1956, Suppes 1970, Cartwright 
1983, Eells 1991); causation is the relation that holds 
between means and ends (Gasking 1955, von Wright 
1975, Woodward 2003); causes are events but for which 
their effects would not have happened (Lewis 1986); 
causes and effects are connected by physical processes 
that are capable of transmitting certain types of proper-
ties (Salmon 1984, Dowe 2000). 
It often happens, however, that advances in science 
force people to abandon aspects of their common sense 
picture of the world. For example, Einstein's theories of 
relativity have forced people to rethink their conceptions 
of time, space, matter, and energy. What lessons does sci-
ence teach about the concept of causation? 
RUSSELL'S CHALLENGE 
In 1912, the eminent British philosopher Bertrand Rus-
sell delivered his paper "On the Notion of Cause" before 
the Aristotelian Society. In this paper, he claimed that the 
notion of cause had no place in a scientific worldview: 
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that 
causation is one of the fundamental axioms or 
postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in 
advanced sciences such as gravitational astron-
omy, the word "cause" never appears ... To me, 
it seems that . . . the reason why physics has 
ceased to look for causes is that, in fact, there are 
no such things. The law of causality, I believe, 
like much that passes muster among philoso-
phers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like 
the monarchy, only because it is erroneously 
supposed to do no harm. (p. 1) 
Russell was not alone in this view. Other writers of 
the period, such as Ernst Mach (the German physicist and 
philosopher of science), Karl Pearson (the father of mod-
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ern statistics), and Pierre Duhem (French physicist, as 
well as historian and philosopher of science), also argued 
that causation did not belong in the world of science. 
This view was shared by the logical positivists, a group of 
philosophers working primarily in Austria and Germany 
between the World Wars whose ideas shaped much of 
philosophy of science in the twentieth century. A general 
suspicion of causal notions also pervaded a number of 
fields outside of philosophy, such as statistics and psy-
chology. 
CAUSATION IN SCIENCE 
Despite Russell's remark, it is simply false that the word 
"cause" (and its cognates) does not appear in the 
advanced sciences. Russell's claim can be readily refuted 
by perusing any leading science journal. Admittedly, 
some uses of the word "cause" and its cognates have spe-
cific technical meanings-such as talk of "causal struc-
ture" in connection with the general theory of 
relativity-but frequently enough these words are used in 
their ordinary English sense. To cite just one example, an 
issue of Physical Review Letters from 2003 contains an 
article titled "Specific-Heat Anomaly Caused by 
Ferroelectric Nanoregions in Pb(Mg[sub 1/3]Nb[sub 
2/3])0[sub 3] and Pb(Mg[sub 1/3]Ta[sub 2/3])0[sub 3] 
Relaxors." Moreover, it has become common in physics to 
classify a variety of phenomena as "effects": there is the 
"Hall effect;' the "Kondo effect;' the "Lamb-shift effect;' 
the "Zeeman effect," and so on. But surely "cause and 
effect" are an inseparable pair: where there are causes, 
there are effects that are caused by them, and where there 
are effects, there are causes that cause them. 
The person on the street is more likely to encounter 
causal claims from the medical sciences, such as: "Choles-
terol in the bloodstream causes hardened arteries, which 
in turn causes heart attacks." While the medical sciences 
may not be as advanced as Russell's example of gravita-
tional astronomy, it· is implausible to think that these 
causal claims are the result of conceptual confusion, or 
are otherwise scientifically disreputable. 
Despite the falsehood of its most provocative claim, 
however, Russell's paper does succeed in highlighting a 
number of important and interesting problems about the 
role of causation in science. 
ANTI-FUNDAMENTALISM 
Although the advanced sciences have hardly eschewed 
talk of causation, it is true that the deepest physical prin-
ciples-such as Newton's three laws of motion, his law of 
universal gravitation, Maxwell's equations governing the 
electric and magnetic fields, Schrodinger's equation gov-
erning the evolution of quantum systems, and Einstein's 
field equations relating the distribution of mass-energy in 
the universe with the structure of space and time-make 
no mention of causation. All of these principles take the 
form of mathematical equations and act as constraints on 
possible states of physical systems (under suitable mathe-
matical characterizations). A given sequence of states may 
be compatible with, for example, Newton's laws of 
motion, but nothing in those laws explicitly says that cer-
tain states (or aspects of those states) cause others. This 
suggests that the causal relation is not part of the consti-
tution of the world at the deepest metaphysical level, a 
view that the historian and philosopher of science John 
Norton labels "anti-fundamentalism" (Norton 2003). 
Indeed, the world described by fundamental physics is in 
many ways at odds with the ordinary picture of a world 
regimented by cause and effect relationships. 
ASYMMETRY 
People normally think of causation as both asymmetric 
and temporally biased. It is asymmetric in the sense that if 
Cis a cause of E, then (always? typically?) E is not a cause 
of C. This claim must be stated with some care. It may be, 
for instance, that anxiety is a cause of insomnia, which is 
in turn a cause of anxiety. But it is one's anxiety on Mon-
day evening that causes insomnia on Monday night, 
which in turn causes anxiety on Tuesday morning. Mon-
day night's insomnia is not both the cause and the effect 
of one and the same episode of anxiety. Causation is tem-
porally biased in the sense that causes (always? typically?) 
occur before their effects in time. 
By contrast, the fundamental laws of physics men-
tioned above are all time-reversal invariant. That is, if a 
particular sequence of states of a physical system is con-
sistent with the laws of physics, then the temporally 
reversed sequence is also consistent with those laws. The 
laws of physics do not discriminate between the past and 
the future in the way that causation does;with two possi-
ble exceptions. The first exception involves the statistical 
laws governing the decay of certain mesons. While these 
laws exhibit a slight temporal asymmetry, the phenomena 
in question seem too esoteric to be of much help in 
understanding the asymmetry of causation. 
The second exception is the second law of thermody-
namics, which states that the entropy of a closed system 
can increase but never decrease. Thus a closed system 
whose entropy is increasing is consistent with the second 
law, while the temporal reverse of this system is not. The 
second law of thermodynamics is not, however, a funda-
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mental law. The entropy of a physical system is deter-
mined by the physical state of the particles that make up 
the system, as characterized in terms of ordinary physical 
parameters such as position and momentum. These par-
ticles are in turn governed by the time-reversal invariant 
laws already mentioned. It is thus something of a mystery 
how the asymmetric second law of thermodynamics can 
arise from the underlying symmetric dynamics governing 
the constituents of thermodynamic systems. One promi-
nent view is that the second law of thermodynamics is the 
result of de facto temporal asymmetries in the boundary 
conditions of the universe. 
There have been a few attempts to ground the asym-
metry of causation in the second law of thermodynamics. 
The basic idea is that the best characterization of our 
physical universe will include not only the fundamental 
laws of physics, but also the statement that in the past our 
universe was in a state of very low entropy-the so-called 
"past hypothesis."When entertaining various counterfac-
tual suppositions, one conjoins those suppositions with 
the laws of physics and the past hypothesis to determine 
what the world would be like if those suppositions were 
true. Because people hold fixed features of the past, but 
not of the future, when entertaining contrary-to-fact sup-
positions, any changes from the actual world introduced 
in those suppositions will tend to entail significant 
changes in the future but only insignificant changes in the 
past. In this way, macroscopic features of the future will 
counterfactually depend upon what is true in the present, 
whereas macroscopic features of the past will not. This 
asymmetric relation of counterfactual dependence can 
then serve as the basis of an account of causation (such as 
that of David Lewis in "Causation" [1986)). If this 
account is correct, then the existence of an asymmetric 
causal relation is not guaranteed by the laws of physics 
but is rather the consequence of contingent asymmetries 
in the boundary conditions of the world. 
The best-known attempt to account for causal asym-
metry is the common cause principle, first formulated by 
the German-American Philosopher Hans Reichenbach 
and presented in his posthumously published book The 
Direction of Time (1956). For Reichenbach, temporal 
order and causal order are conceptually intertwined. 
Reichenbach defines causation in terms of probabilities 
and temporal order, but temporal order is itself defined in 
terms of asymmetries in probabilities. LetA and B be two 
events that are probabilistically correlated; in other words, 
the probability that A and B will occur together, P(A & 
B), is greater than the product of the individual probabil-
ities, P(A)P(B ). (If the two probabilities are equal, then A 
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and B are said to be probabilistically independent.) An 
event Cis said to "screen off" A from B if it renders them 
conditionally independent; that is, if P(A & BiC) = 
P(AiC)P(BiC). If there is an earlier event C that screens 
off A from B, but no later event that does so, then the trio 
ABC forms a conjunctive fork open to the future. If there is 
a later screener-off E, but no earlier one, then ABE is a 
conjunctive fork open to the past. Finally, if there is an 
earlier and a later screener-off, then that is a closed fork. 
According to Reichenbach, the overwhelming majority of 
open forks are open to the future, and this probabilistic 
asymmetry provides the basis for the distinction between 
the past and the future. Reichenbach further held that if 
two events A and B are correlated, and neither is a cause 
of the other, then there exists a common cause of A and B 
in their mutual past that screens A off from B. 
Reichenbach believed that his common cause princi-
ple was related to the second law of thermodynamics. 
Think of A & B as one possible state of a physical system, 
the other possible states being A & -B, -A & B, and -A & 
-B. A probability distribution over these states in which A 
and B are correlated contains information, in a sense that 
is made precise within the mathematical field of informa-
tion theory. From a formal perspective, information is 
inversely related to entropy. Thus a correlation between A 
and B is like a low entropy state of a physical system, and 
it is to be explained in terms of an earlier causal interac-
tion between the system and its external environment. 
There are a number of difficulties facing Reichen-
bach's common cause principle. The principle seems to 
fail for certain quantum phenomena involving distant 
correlations, such as the one featured in the famous 
thought experiment by the physicists Albert Einstein, 
Boris Podolski, and Nathan Rosen, in their 1935 paper 
"Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Reality Be 
Considered Complete?" In a simplified version of this 
setup, two particles form a single system in which the 
total spin is zero. If the particles are separated, and the 
spin of each particle is measured, they will always be 
found to have opposite spins. There is thus a correlation 
between the outcome of the two measurements. Neither 
measurement result can be a cause of the other, for the 
measurements can be conducted at such a great distance 
that not even a light signal could connect the two. Yet a 
series of mathematical and empirical results, beginning 
with the work of the physicist John Bell in 1964, show 
that there can be no earlier state of the two-particle sys-
tem that screens off the measurement outcomes. 
A further problem is that it is unclear why Reichen-
bach's fork asymmetry should hold within the physical 
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framework of classical statistical mechanics. Within this 
framework, a system possesses a microstate that evolves 
deterministically according to Newton's laws of motion. 
An "event" A is just a coarse-grained characterization of 
the state of the system at a particular time, consistent with 
many different microstates. A probability distribution is 
defined over the possible states of the system. Suppose 
that the events A and B are correlated according to this 
probability measure, and that there is an earlier event C 
that screens off A from B. It is possible to take the image 
of C under the deterministic dynamics of the system; that 
is, one can evolve each microstate in C to some point in 
time after the occurrence of A and B and collect the 
resulting set of microstates into a new event C'. By con- · 
struction, C' will stand in the same probability relations 
with A and B that C did. Hence, C' will be a later event 
that screens off A from B, and ABCC' will form a closed 
fork. Because this procedure is fully general, it is not clear 
how there can be forks open to the future at all. One pos-
sible reply to this worry is that in such a closed fork, the 
later screener-off C' will just be a heterogeneous collec-
tion of microstates, and hence will not qualify as an 
"event" in the relevant sense. This reply raises two new 
questions: first, which sets of microstates constitute gen-
uine events? Second, why should we expect that only ear-
lier screeners off will be genuine events? 
FURTHER CAUSAL ANOMALIES 
There are a number of further respects in which the 
world described by fundamental physics seems not to be 
one ruled by relations of cause and effect. It is well known 
that certain quantum-mechanical phenomena such as 
radioactive decay appear to be indeterministic. For exam-
ple, even a complete description of the present state of a 
carbon-14 atom cannot allow one to predict whether or 
not it will decay during a certain period of time, but will 
instead yield only a probability that decay will occur. If 
the atom does eventually decay, can anything be said to 
cause the decay event? This kind of indeterminism pro-
vides part of the motivation for attempts to analyze cau-
sation in terms of probabilities. But even probabilistic 
theories of causation have difficulties when indetermin-
ism is coupled with the sorts of distant correlations 
described in the previous section. 
Moreover, even classical Newtonian physics admits 
indeterminism. For example, John Norton, in "Causation 
as Folk Science," describes a system consisting of a point 
mass sitting at the apex of a bell-shaped dome. Newton's 
laws of motion permit the point mass to rest there indef-
initely, but they also allow it to begin sliding down the 
side of the dome in an arbitrary direction after an arbi-
trary finite time. No force is necessary to dislodge the 
mass: the sudden motion of the mass down the side of the 
dome is fully consistent with the constraint that at every 
instant, the force acting on the mass (due to the pull of 
gravity, and the reactive push of the dome's wall) is pro-
portional to its acceleration. Such a motion thus appears 
to be entirely uncaused. 
Einstein's general theory of relativity also gives rise to 
causal anomalies. For example, the Austrian-American 
mathematician Kurt Godel showed that Einstein's field 
equations permitted solutions in which there were closed 
causal curves. Thus it may be possible for a billiard ball to 
get knocked, continue rolling along its new trajectory, 
and then eventually bump into its earlier self, knocking it 
into that new trajectory in the first place. Such a scenario 
appears to be at odds with people's ordinary conception 
of causation as an asymmetric relation, for the collision 
between the older and younger billiard ball causes the tra-
jectory of the younger ball, which in turn causes that col-
lision. 
CAUSAL INFERENCE 
One of Russell's targets in "On the Notion of Cause" was 
the so-called "law of causality"; indeed, it is this law, 
rather than the "notion of cause" itself, whose utility is 
compared to that of the British monarchy. Russell cites a 
formulation of this principle from the nineteenth-
century British philosopher John Stuart Mill: "The Law of 
Causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of 
inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invari-
ability of succession is found by observation to obtain 
between every fact in nature and some other fact which 
has preceded it." (Mill1856, p. 359.) 
According to Mill, science discovers causal relation-
ships by discovering invariable regularities in nature, and 
the success of science presupposes the pervasiveness of 
such regularities. Russell was certainly right to challenge 
the importance of this law to science-riot because sci-
ence is not in the business of discovering causal relation-
ships, but because causal inference in science does not 
rest upon the discovery of perfect regularities. 
Causal inference presents a prima facie difficulty, 
first articulated by the Scottish philosopher David Hume 
in 1739. Suppose that one billiard ball collides with a sec-
ond, causing it to move. One can observe the motion of 
the first billiard ball; and one can observe the motion of 
the second billiard ball; but one cannot observe the cau-
sation that connects the two together. How, then, is a per-
son to acquire knowledge of causal relationships? 
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Traditionally there have been two main lines of 
response to this problem. One line that has already been 
mentioned is to reject the notion of causation on the 
grounds that it is inaccessible to empirical investigation. 
The second line, adopted in different ways by Hume, Mill, 
and a number of twentieth and twenty-first century 
philosophers, is to try to spell out systematic connections 
between causation and observable phenomena such as 
empirical regularities in order to explain how the former 
can be inferred from the latter. The "law of causation" 
championed by Mill and attacked by Russell stems from 
this second line of response to the problem. (A third pos-
sibility, defended in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury by the French-American philosopher C. J. Ducasse, 
and in the middle of the twentieth century by the Belgian 
psychologist Andre Michotte, is to reject the claim that 
causation is not subject to direct perception. Even if this 
is possible in special cases such as billiard ball collisions, 
however, this hardly seems to be an adequate explanation 
for causal knowledge generally.) This problem concern-
ing the empirical accessibility of causation has been a 
driving force behind attempts to banish causation, and 
also behind attempts to provide causation with a sound 
philosophical analysis. 
In fact, however, causal inference is neither impossi-
ble nor a matter of reading causal relations off universal 
regularities or correlations. Causal inference, like other 
forms of scientific inference, is broadly "hypothetico-
deductive" in character. A causal hypothesis is formu-
lated, and in conjunction with various background 
assumptions (often involving causal relationships them-
selves), it is used to derive predictions about what types of 
correlations will be observed. These predictions are then 
compared with observations. In this way, causal hypothe-
ses may be subjected to empirical test without the need 
for a direct reduction of causal claims to claims about 
regularities and the like. 
EXPERIMENTATION 
The most reliable causal knowledge comes not from pas-
sive observations, but from controlled experimentation. 
In the medical sciences, the experiments often take the 
form of randomized clinical trials. Consider the claim 
that a particular drug causes lowered blood pressure. 
How might one test this claim? One possibility would be 
to make the drug available on the open market and 
observe hypertension patients who choose to take the 
drug and those who do not. There is a problem with this 
methodology. Suppose that the drug is expensive; one 
might expect that patients who buy the drug will be 
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wealthier on average then those who do not. Wealthier 
patients might enjoy any number of other benefits-such 
as access to better health care generally, better diets, and so 
on-that influence whether or not they experience a 
reduction in hypertension. If one finds that patients who 
take the drug do in fact experience greater reduction in 
blood pressure levels than those who do not, it can still 
not be known whether this reduction is due to the drug 
or due to one of the other advantages associated with 
wealth. In a randomized trial, it is determined randomly 
which patients will receive the drug and which will be 
given a placebo instead. Randomization helps to ensure 
that treatment is not correlated with any other causes that 
might influence recovery. 
This example helps to show the importance of the 
distinction between genuine causal relationships, on the 
one hand, and mere regularities or correlations on the 
other. Suppose that the drug is available only to wealthy 
patients, and that patients who take the drug fare better, 
on average, than those who do not. If this correlation is 
due to the wealth of the patients who use the drug, rather 
than to any effect of the drug itself on hypertension, then 
one would not expect the correlation to persist under var-
ious policy interventions. For example, if the drug were to 
be covered by insurance, so that less wealthy patients 
could also afford to take the drug, then the correlation 
between use of the drug and lowered hypertension would 
disappear. As the philosopher Nancy Cartwright puts it in 
her paper "Causal Laws and Effective Strategies" (1983), 
causal relationships support "effective strategies," while 
mere correlations or regularities do not. It is for this rea-
son, Cartwright argues, contrary to the opinion of Rus-
sell, that the notion of cause cannot be dispensed with. It 
is also for this reason that one often finds the most self-
conscious attention to the specific concerns of causal 
inference in those branches of science that have a practi-
cal dimension, such as medicine and agronomy. 
In many areas of science, randomized trials are not 
feasible. This may be due to the inability to produce the 
putative cause at will, or it may be due to the lack any ana-
log of a control group that receives placebos. Nonetheless, 
in the experimental setting, it is often possible to isolate 
the influence of the cause under investigation by prevent-
ing other causes from operating. For example, an experi-
ment might be conducted within a metallic container to 
eliminate external magnetic influences; or the experi-
mental apparatus may be set afloat in a pool of mercury 
to prevent vibrations from being transmitted through the 
floor of the laboratory (as was done in the famous 
Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887, which failed to 
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detect any effect of the earth's motion on the speed at 
which light traveled). Sometimes the experimental prepa-
rations are more mundane, such as thoroughly dusting 
the apparatus to eliminate the effects of stray dust parti-
cles, or even removing pigeons found nesting in the appa-
ratus (as was required by Arno Penzias and Robert 
Wilson, who discovered the cosmic microwave back-
ground in 1965). 
CAUSAL MODELS 
In some fields, such as macroeconomics, epidemiology, 
and sociology, experimental manipulation is simply not 
feasible, and causal relationships must be inferred from 
observed correlations. Beginning around 1990 has been 
an explosion of interest in developing causal modeling 
techniques to facilitate such nonexperimental causal 
inferences. Two important works that have garnered a 
substantial amount of attention from philosophers are 
Causation, Prediction and Search (2000), by the philoso-
phers Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard 
Scheines, and Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference 
(2000) by the computer scientist Judea Pearl. Both frame-
works employ graphs to represent causal relationships 
among sets of causal variables. The variables in a set V 
form the nodes of a graph, and certain pairs of variables 
are connected by edges in the graph. In a directed graph, 
the edges take the form of arrows, which point from one 
variable into another. If a graph over the variable set V 
contains an arrow from the variable X to the variable Y, 
that indicates that X is a direct cause of Y (also called a 
parent of Y): the value of X has an effect on the value of Y 
that is not mediated by any other variable in the set V. 
The causal structure represented by a directed graph 
is connected to a probability distribution over the values 
of the variables by the causal Markov condition. This con-
dition states that, conditional upon the values of its direct 
causes, the values of a variable are probabilistically inde-
pendent of the values of all other variables, except for its 
effects. In other words, a variable's parents screen off that 
variable from all other variables, except for its effects. (The 
causal Markov condition is closely related to Reichen-
bach's common cause principle, discussed above.) 
With the help of the causal Markov condition, as well 
as other conditions such as the minimality and the faith-
fulness conditions, a graph representing causal relation-
ships among a set of variables will serve as a model that 
makes predictions about probabilistic relationships 
among the variables. In particular, it predicts that certain 
variables will be dependent or independent of others, 
either unconditionally, or conditional upon the values of 
other variables. These predictions can then be tested 
using normal statistical means. 
The most obvious use of these methods is to test 
whether a postulated set of causal relationships among 
the variables in the set Vis consistent with the statistical 
data about the values of those variables. But there are 
other types of problems where these methods can be 
applied. Even if one does not begin by hypothesizing a 
specific causal model, it is possible to determine which 
sets of causal relations among a variable set are consistent 
with the statistical data. Typically, the data will not single 
out one causal model, but will only pick out an equiva-
lence class of statistically indistinguishable models. In this 
case, background knowledge may help to narrow the set 
of plausible models. In a different sort of problem, one 
begins with a qualitative causal model and uses it to make 
quantitative predictions about the effects of interventions 
that have not yet been performed. 
It is important to note that the causal Markov condi-
tion is not an a priori constraint on the relationship 
between causal structure and probability. It can fail, for 
instance, if a variable set Vomits a variable that is a com-
mon cause of two variables included in V. The causal 
Markov condition is at best an empirical assumption that 
holds for a wide variety of causal structures, and hence 
any application of techniques based on the causal Markov 
condition to infer causal relationships from probabilistic 
data carries substantive empirical presuppositions. A 
number of critics have charged that these presuppositions 
severely limit the utility of the new causal modeling tech-
niques. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contrary to Russell's claim, causal noti?ns are as perva-
sive in science as they are in philosophy and everyday life. 
New scientific techniques continue to be developed for 
the discovery of causal relationships. Nonetheless, the 
world as it is described by the deepest physical principles 
bears little resemblance to a world that is regimented by 
asymmetrical causal relationships. Thus there remain a 
number of deep puzzles about how causal relationships 
can emerge from physical laws that themselves make no 
mention of causality. 
See also Causation, Metaphysical Issues; Probability and 
Chance. 
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CAUSATION IN INDIAN 
PHILOSOPHY 
Indian philosophical theories, from their earliest specula-
tive cosmologies and explorations of the nature of human 
existence-in the Vedas and Upanisads, whose composi-
tions were completed by roughly the first half of the first 
millennium BCE-emphasized the plight of humans and 
their struggle towards a soteriological goal. An under-
standing of the evolution of the world and the place of 
human beings within it held out the hope of improving 
their lot, either in some other place after death or in the 
next life in the round of deaths and rebirths. Or even, as 
the Upanisads suggested, in the ultimate avoidance of 
rebirth itself-a theme adopted by much Indian philoso-
phy thereafter. 
As in Western metaphysical speculations about the 
nature of the cosmos and man's place within it, the Indian 
thinkers made central and vital use of the concept of a 
cause-karana in Sanskrit-and progressively developed 
a sophisticated understanding of this concept. 
VEDAS AND UPANISADS 
The earliest Vedic answers to the question of cosmologi-
cal evolution suggested a god or gods, variously named 
and described, as creating and ruling over the human 
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